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Penticuff: Penticuff: Mandatory Retirement

Notes
Mandatory Retirement for Missouri Judges
Gregory v. Ashcroft'
I. INTRODUCTION

When an employee is forced from employment on a basis other than
performance it seems to offend the concept of fairness. In the cases involving
the mandatory retirement of state court judges, however, the harsh result for
the affected judges must be balanced against society's interest in a competent
judiciary. Although advancing age usually does not render a judge incompetent, the approach of legislators and voters has been to err on the side of
caution, basing the mandatory retirement mechanism on the arbitrary factor of
age. When these two interests collide, the result changes the balance between
individual rights and societal interests.
II. FACTS
Four Missouri state court judges filed suit in the Federal Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, disputing the mandatory retirement provision of
the Missouri Constitution,2 which requires their retirement at age seventy. 3 At

1. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
2. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 26(1) ("All judges other than municipal judges shall retire
at the age of seventy years, except as provided in the schedule to this article, under a
retirement plan provided by law.") Section twenty-five establishes the rules concerning
Missouri state court judges. According to Section 25(a) of the Missouri Constitution,
[w]henever a vacancy shall occur in the office of judge of any of the
following courts of this state, to wit: The supreme court, the court of
appeals, or in the office of circuit or associate circuit judge within the city
of St. Louis and Jackson county, the governor shall fill such vacancy by
appointing one of three persons possessing the qualifications for such office,
who shall be nominated and whose names shall be submitted to the
governor by a nonpartisan judicial commission established and organized
as hereinafter provided. If the governor fails to'appoint any of the
nominees within sixty days after the list of nominees is submitted, the
nonpartisan judicial commission making the nomination shall appoint one
of the nominees to fill the vacancy.
Id. § 25(a). Judges are then subject to retention elections after a full year of service
("a term ending December thirty-first following the next general election after the
expiration of twelve months in the office" Id. § 25(c)(1)). To continue in office the
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trial, Judge Ellis Gregory, Jr., Judge Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., and Judge
Douglas W. Greene claimed that "the mandatory retirement provision violates
the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").i 4 Judge Flake
L. McHaney joined the three judges in alleging a violation of the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss.6 The district
court held that because Missouri's appointed judges are employees "on a
policymaking level," they are exempted from the ADEA's definition of
"employee,"7 and thus not protected by the act. The district court also found
"that the mandatory retirement provision does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because there is a rational basis for the distinction between judges and
other state officials to whom no mandatory retirement age applies. "8
The district court's dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 9 On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
a state court judge must comply with a state constitutional provision calling
for mandatory retirement at the age of seventy years. 0
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The ADEA Analysis
The ADEA prohibits discrimination against employees based on their
age." Since enacting the legislation in 1967, Congress has expanded the
statute's scope. 2 Presently, the ADEA protects all employees age forty or

judge must file to succeed himself sixty days before the last general election prior to
the expiration of the judge's term. Id. See A FirstStep Toward JudicialReform, 26
J. of Mo. BAR 341 (1970) for thoughts on the purpose behind the statute.
3. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2398.
4. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 599 (8th Cir. 1990).
5. Id.
6. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2398.
7. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (1986)).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2408.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
12. Congress amended the original ADEA on three occasions: 1974, 1978, and
1986.
The original ADEA did not protect those over sixty-five years of age. 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 658. In 1978 the statute was amended to raise the age limit to seventy.
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 189. The age limit was eliminated by the 1986 amendment. 1986
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over whose employers employ more than twenty people.13 The ADEA also
The ADEA excepts certain
covers state and municipal employees.14
employers from compliance with its provisions prohibiting age discrimination."5 Extending the ADEA to the states was held valid under Congress'
Commerce Clause power.' 6 To state a claim under the ADEA, the claimant
must show that the employer violated the ADEA's broad age discrimination
provisions,17 that the claimant is a protected "employee" under the ADEA,18
and that the employer is included in the ADEA's definition of "employer."' 9
The Missouri judges challenged article five, section twenty-five of the
Missouri Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll judges other than municipal
judges shall retire at the age of seventy years., 2 0 Like all state employees, the
four Missouri judges would normally be subject to the provisions of the
ADEA.
Several courts have dealt with the question of whether the ADEA applies
to state judges.2 ' Because all courts have agreed that elected judges fall under
the "persons elected to public office" exception to the ADEA, the narrow issue
is whether appointed judges are covered by the act.22 Therefore, discussion
often centers on the ADEA provision that excepts from the definition of

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3342. (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988)).
The original ADEA definition of "employers" only applied to employers of fifty
or more persons and did not apply to states as employers. 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 658,
662. The 1974 amendment to the ADEA, however, extended its provisions to states
and lowered the number of employees from fifty to twenty. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 58.
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1988)).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
14. Id.
15. The ADEA allows behavior that may be discriminatory when age is part of
a bona fide employee benefit plan or when age is a bona fide occupational requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988).
16. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988).
18. Id. § 630(f).
19. Id. § 630(b).
20. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2398 (quoting Mo. CONsT. art V, § 26).
21. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d. 52 (1st Cir. 1988) (ADEA not
applicable to appointed state court judges); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D.
Il. 1989) (same); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 517 N.E.2d 141 (Mass.
1988) (same); In re Stout, 559 A.2d 489 (Pa. 1989) (same); but see EEOC v. Vermont,
904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), affg, 717 F. Supp. 261 (D. Vt. 1989); Schlitz v.
Virginia, 641 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir.
1988) (upholding application of the ADEA to appointed state judges).
22. Id.
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employees those employees who are "appointee[s] on a policymaking
level." 23 Cases discussing this provision deal with federalism and statutory
construction problems concerning the applicability of the ADEA to appointed
state court judges.
The first question, which involves federalism, is whether the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, when applied to state mandatory
retirement systems, requires that the ADEA preempt contrary state law.
The standard of review in this area requires a "clear statement of intent" to
preempt state law.2 The courts interpreting the ADEA agreed that "a clear
statement" of congressional intent was required for the ADEA to preempt state
law.
In Apkin v. Treasurer & Receiver General,27 judge Benjamin Apkin

challenged Massachusetts's mandatory retirement of state judges at seventy
years of age.m The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Apkin found nothing
in the ADEA that showed Congress intended the ADEA to apply to judges,
so it found no preemptive effect.29 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit also found that there was no congressional intent to preempt
state law. 0 The court noted that a state's sovereignty should not be abridged
by the federal government unless there is a mandate from Congress."
One commentator has attacked the "clear statement" interpretation,
however, because the ADEA's broad anti-discriminatory scope puts the federal
law in sharp conflict with state mandatory retirement provisions. There is no
need to find a "clear statement" of intent to preempt because of the obvious
clash between the federal and state law.32 When state law conflicts with

23. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
24. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
25. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (This case

adopted the "clear statement rule" in a case involving a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in Federal court. The Court held that Congress could abrogate the
immunity "only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.").
26. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v.
Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. I11.1989); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver
General, 517 N.E.2d 141, 142-43 (Mass. 1988).
27. 517 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1988).
28. Apkin, 517 N.E.2d at 145.
29. Id. at 144-45.
30. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir. 1988).
31. Id. at 53; see also EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. I11.1989).
32. Alan L. Bushlow, MandatoryRetirement ofState-Appointed Judgesunder the
Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 476, 493 (1991).
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federal law, the federal law prevails, although the necessity of finding a "clear
statement" of intent to preempt seems contrary to the basic rules of federalism
that would seemingly allow the federal law to control when contrary to state
law. While some commentators attempt to find evidence of a "clear
statement, 3 3 this evidence is slight, and in any event, appears unnecessary.
The second question involves statutory construction arguments and their
influence on Gregory. The "plain meaning rule" requires a court to limit its
inquiry to the text of the statute when its language makes the meaning
clear.34 In EEOC v. Massachusetts the court of appeals thought that the
ADEA's exemption of "appointees on the policymaking level" included
appointed state judges. 35 The court reasoned that while the judicial branch
does not make the same types of policy decisions as the executive or
legislative branches, the exercise of judicial power does require "the same kind
of decision-making and the same kind of forward thinking that is required of
'appointees on the policymaking level' in those other two branches of
government. 3 6 Thus, the court held that appointed state court judges were
not covered by the ADEA.37
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Stou 8 also resolved a dispute
concerning whether Pennsylvania's appointed judges were covered by the
ADEA by invoking the "plain-meaning rule. 3 9 The Stout court found that
appointed judges were not protected employees, relying not only on the
judge's "policymaking" decisions, but also on the judge's administrative duties
over the Pennsylvania state judiciary.4"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in EEOC v.
Vermont,41 however, applied the plain-meaning rule and reached the opposite

33. The legislative history of the ADEA shows that Congress intended the Act to
be broad in scope with limited exceptions. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 15-16 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179-80.
34. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation
does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.")
(citation omitted).
35. 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988). The court stated that "if Congress did not
specifically consider applying ADEA to judges, and the exception by its terms and its
goals appears to apply to judges, we will so construe it. The absence of any mention
of judges in the legislative debate, therefore, does not help the appellant's case." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 56.
38. 559 A.2d 489 (Pa. 1989).
39. Id. at 495-96.
40. Id. at 495-96.
41. 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
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result.4 2 The court stated that "the principal business of the courts is the
resolution of disputes."4 3 The Second Circuit found that the role of the court
44
was not "policymaking," even though the courts occasionally make policy.
Thus, philosophical viewpoints concerning the actual and proper role of courts
in determining disputes are central to the application of the plain-meaning rule
to the ADEA's "policymaking" exception.
The "rule against absurd results" 45 also has been applied to resolve cases
involving the ADEA's application to appointed state court judges. 6 The
Apkin court found that excluding elected judges from ADEA protection and
including appointed judges within ADEA protection was an irrational
distinction.47 The distinction between elected and appointed state court
judges was deemed "nonsensical" in EEOC v. Massachusetts.4 8 The district
court in EEOC v. Illinois also held that there was "no principled basis" to
distinguish between elected and appointed judges. 9
Other courts, however, have found that the distinction between elected
and appointed judges is reasonable. The Second Circuit held in EEOC v.
Vermont that Congress "presumably" knew that some states elected judges and
some states appointed judges and it could have specified whether they were
employees. 0 The court also stated that Congress chose to "except only
elected officials and a narrowly defined group of appointees, leaving all other
appointees covered by the Act."51 The court added that "any perceived
imprudence... is a matter to be addressed by Congress."52

42. Id. at 800.
43. Id.

44. Id. ("Though such a judicial decision may thus state or clarify policy, any
such statement or clarification is merely ancillary to the resolution of a particular
controversy between parties."); accord Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 333 (E.D.
Va. 1988).
45. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) ("Statutes

should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever
possible.").
46. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v.
Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver
General of Massachusetts, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1988).

47. Apkin, 517 N.E.2d at 145.
48. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 51.

49. EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159.
50. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 801; accord Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp.
330, 334 (E.D. Va. 1988).
51. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 802.
52. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 802.
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The legislative history of the ADEA, though limited, has been used in
interpreting the ADEA's applicability to appointed state court judges.5 3 The
First Circuit in EEOC v. Massachusetts and the Second Circuit in EEOC v.
Vermont examined the legislative history of the ADEA, again reaching
opposite conclusions.54 Because the question is whether appointed state
judges are considered "employees" under the ADEA, the discussion revolves
around the interpretation of the exceptions to the definition of "employee."
There is no mention of judges in any of the legislative discussions or
debates surrounding the adoption of the ADEA. s The courts, however, have
looked to the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,56 and have given it weight in determining the legislative intent of those
who enacted the ADEA" One indication of the purpose of that statute is
the Committee Report for the EEOC, which states that the exceptions were
posited to
exempt elected officials and members of their personal staffs, and persons
appointed by such elected officials as advisers or to policymaking positions
at the highest levels of the departments or agencies of the State or local
officers, and persons of comparable responsigovernments, such as cabinet
58
bilities at the local level
This excerpt seems to support the argument that the exceptions to the ADEA
do not include judges, because they were never mentioned in the Committee
Report.
The record of the exchange between Senator Williams and Senator Ervin
is also significant. It shows that Senator Ervin's proposed amendment 9 was

53. Because of the inherent ambiguities in interpreting legislative history the plain
meaning and absurd result tests are usually more reliable. Public policies supporting
the statute usually are examined before the legislative history test is applied.
54. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 56; EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at
800.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N 5628; S. REP. No. 467,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978)
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528; S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1978)
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 701, 2000e(f) (1965) (amended 1977).
57. See Lorilland Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Oscar Meyer
& Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979).
58. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179-80.
59. 118 Cong. Rec. 1183 (1972) ("The term 'employee' as set forth in the original
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expanded (on the proposal of Senator Williams) to exclude "any person
chosen by such officer to be a personal assistant."' However, because
Senator Javits was concerned that the proposed amendment would exclude61
"lawyers ... stenographers, subpoena servers, researchers, and so forth,"
the Conference Committee used the phrase "appointee on the policymaking
level." 62 The committee also stated that "[i]t is the conferees['] intent that
this exemption shall be construed narrowly." 63 Thus, the legislative history
points to a limited application of the "appointees on the policymaking level"
exception.
Contrary to the evidence discussed above, however, in applying the rules
of statutory construction, the majority of courts decided that appointed state
court judges are not protected by the ADEA.64 Some courts, however, have
found that the ADEA was applicable to state judges based on different
interpretations of the statute. 65 Gregory resolved a split in the circuits over
the applicability of the ADEA to appointed state court judges.
B. The Equal ProtectionAnalysis
Because the Supreme Court of the United States decided that age is not
a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and there is no "fundamental interest" in serving as a state judge,
the statute is subject to only "rational basis" review. In dispensing with
prior cases involving state court judges challenging mandatory retirement
provisions, each case was decided on the basis of the ADEA claim and not
through an equal protection analysis.

act of 1964 and as modified in the pending bill shall not include any person elected
to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
thereof, or any person chosen by such person to advise him in respect to the exercise
of the constitutional or legal powers of his office.").
60. Id. at 4493.
61. Id. at 4097.
62. S. CONF.

REP.

No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972), reprintedin 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179-80; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
63. S.CONF. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179-80; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
64. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721
F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Il1.1989); In re Stout, 559 A.2d 489 (Pa. 1989); Apkin, 517
N.E.2d at 141.
65. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), aft'g, 717 F. Supp. 261 (D.
Vt. 1989); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds,
854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
66. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313-14 (1976).
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Many of the proposed rational bases advanced by Missouri in Gregory,
however, were also used in other cases to bolster and justify the result. In
Apkin, the Massachusetts court claimed that its mandatory retirement provision
"eliminates the anguish, time, delay, expense and embarrassment of the
supervision and removal of older judges of failing competence pursuant to an
evaluation process."'67 The court also asserted that Massachusetts's mandatory retirement provision assures that judges will be respected, that judges will
share the same generational values with the populace, and that judges who are
forced to retire will make room for the appointment of women and minorities
to the bench. 68
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

69

A. ADEA Claim
The majority in Gregory v. Ashcroft introduced its decision by explaining
the virtues of the federalist system of government and by describing the
70
The Court listed
system of dual sovereignty as a "fundamental principle."
the advantages of a federalist system as follows: (1) a more sensitive
government to the needs of the population; (2) an increased opportunity to
participate in "democratic processes"; (3) more latitude for "innovation and
experimentation"; (4) greater governmental responsiveness; and (5) "a check
on abuses of governmental power."'" The Court also found support for the
value of federalism in the writings of James Madison. 72 Referring to the

67. Apkin, 517 N.E.2d at 146.
68. Id.; see also EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57 (adopting the reasoning
of the Apkin court).
69. The majority opinion in Gregory was penned by Justice O'Connor, who was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter.
Justice White concurred in the judgment, but wrote a separate opinion in which Justice
Stevens joined. Justices White and Stevens also joined the majority opinion's
resolution of the equal protection claim. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Marshall joined.
70. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2399.
71. Id. at 2399-400.
72. Id. at 2400 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 323 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)).
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted
to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate
departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
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Missouri Constitutional provision, the Court stated that "[tihis provision goes
beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the
most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity."73
Following its explanation of the value of federalism, the Court then
described the standard by which encroachment upon state sovereignty is
allowed. The Court held that Congress must make its intention to change the
federal/state balance "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 74
The Court may apply the plain statement rule75 to avoid a potential constitutional problem. 76
Although Justice White concurred in the majority's result, he disagreed
with the rationale that the majority used to dispense with the ADEA claim.7
Justice White criticized the majority's "plain statement rule" as "unsupported
by the decisions upon which the majority relies, contrary to our Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, and fundamentally unsound."7 1
Justice White contended that the only real issue "is whether petitioners
fall within the definition of 'employee' within the Act. 79 If the judges are
employees, then they are covered by the ADEA. Preemption is not an issue
because it automatically applies when state law is in conflict with federal
law. 80
Justice White also found the majority's reasoning as to the "plain
statement rule" misguided because "the only dispute is over the precise details

departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.
Id.
73. Id. at 2400.
74. Id. at 2401 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985)).
75. The Court uses the phrase "plain statement rule" in the same way as the prior
courts have used the "clear statement rule." The distinction is meaningless, but the
Supreme Court chose to use the phrase "plain statement" and this Note will use the
court's label.
76. In the past the Court has refused to consider the limits of federalism on the
Commerce Clause. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
77. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2408. Justice White is joined in this section of his
concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Marshall. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2409; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (standing for the position
that preemption is automatic "to the extent that it [state law] conflicts with federal
law").
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of the statute's application."8' He stated that the majority's reliance on
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon82 and Will v. Michigan Department of
State Polices was misplaced because the issue in those cases was whether
the statute in question was intended to be extended to the states at all.84
Therefore, Justice White concluded, the majority has unnecessarily extended
the plain statement rule. 5
Additionally, Justice White disagreed with the majority's application of
the "political function" cases to the facts of this case.86 Because those cases
dealt with the Equal Protection claims of aliens instead of federal limits on
congressional commerce power, Justice White thought that the majority was
unnecessarily injecting the political function exceptions into the analysis,
limiting congressional legislative power under the "plain statement rule." 87
Justice White also accused the majority of confusing the issue by failing
to explain the scope of its rule and by failing to explain its requirement that
the intent to regulate the activity be "plain to anyone reading the statute.",8
Next, the majority focused on the definition of "employee" under the
ADEA and the "appointees on the policymaking level" exception. The state
argued that Missouri courts make policy because Missouri is a common law
state, because the Missouri Supreme Court has supervisory authority over
lower courts, because the Missouri Supreme Court establishes rules of
procedure, and because the Missouri Supreme Court has the authority to
establish disciplinary rules. 89 The United States Supreme Court found that
for judges to be considered "employees at the policy-making level" that "it
must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges."" The Court
determined that state judges "presumptively" fall under the policymaking-level
exception to the ADEA. 9' The Court reasoned that although Congress could
have been less ambiguous if it meant to exclude state judges, "in this case we

81. Id. at 2409.
82. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).

83. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
84. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2409.
85. Id. at 2409.
86. Id. (Justice White believed that reliance on the "political function" exception
to support the "plain meaning rule" ignores the thrust of the "political function"
exception, which is to exclude aliens from the strict scrutiny normally granted to them,
reserving the governing functions exclusively to citizens.)
87. Id. at 2409-10.
88. Id. at 2410.
89. Id. at 2403-04.
90. Id. at 2404.
91. Id.
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are not looking for a plain statement that judges are excluded."' Instead, the
Court decided that it "will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless
Congress has made it clear that judges are included."93 The Court was
unwilling to give employees whose position94is not specifically mentioned in
the ADEA the benefit of ADEA protection.
Justice White agreed with the majority in the result, but he reached the
result purely on an analysis of whether state court judges were "employees"
under the ADEA.95 He recited the definition of "policy" as "a definite course
or method of action selected (as by a government, institution, group, or
individual) from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to
guide and usu[ally] determine present and future decisions." 96 Justice White
joined the majority in quoting Justice Cardozo's statement on the role of the
judge as a policy maker:
Each [common-law judge] indeed is legislating within the limits of his
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates
only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law ....

[W]ithin the

confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice
moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative. The law which
is the resultingproduct is not found, but made.97

Justice White concluded by adopting the rationale of EEOC v. Massachusetts' and holding that state court judges are exempt from the ADEA as
"appointees on a policymaking level." 99

Justice Blackmun was joined by Justice Marshall in the dissenting
opinion. 1'0 The dissent agreed with part I of White's analysis, which
disagreed with the majority's reasoning on the issue of the ADEA's applicability.101 The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding that an appointed
state judge is an "employee on a policymaking level." 02

92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 2412.
96. Id. at 2412 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1754 (4th ed. 1976)).
97. Id. at 2412 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 113-15 (1921) (emphasis added)).

98. See supra notes 35-37, 48 & 52 and accompanying text.

99. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2414.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The first reason that Justice Blackmun gave in disagreement was that
Congress did not intend to include state judges in the policymaking category.1 3 Because the "policymaker" exception is grouped close to "the
exclusion of 'any person chosen by such [elected] officer to be on such
officer's personal staff,' and the exclusion of 'an immediate advisor with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office,"' the
rules of statutory construction would require that this exclusion relate to the
others."" This rule of construction employed by Justice Blackmun was not
used in the prior cases.
Justice Blackmun first set out the rule that "words grouped in a list
should be given related meaning."'0 5 The rule further states that "'in
expounding a statute, we [are] not ... guided by a single sentence or member
of a sentence, but to the provisions of the whole law, and [by] its object and
policy."' 1 6 Justice Blackmun noted that, "the policy maker exclusion is
placed between the exclusion of 'any person chosen by such [elected] officer
to be on such officer's personal staff' and the exclusion of 'an immediate
advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the
office.

'

10 7

Justice Blackmun stated that the exclusion "should be limited to those
who share the characteristics of personal staff members and immediate
advisers, i.e., those who work closely with the appointing official and are
1
directly accountable to that official.""3

Justice Blackmun also argued that "a reasonable interpretation" of the

ADEA would extend coverage to state judges." 9 The EEOC has found that

it is permissible to read the phrase "appointee at the policymaking level" to
exclude state court judges." ° Justice Blackmun would support this interprethereby adopting the ruling of the Second Circuit in
tation as reasonable,"'
2
Vermont."
v.
EEOC
Because the majority's holding that the state court judges were included
within the "appointees on the policymaking level," the Court chose not to rule
on the states's contention that because the state judges are subject to retention

103. Id.
104. Id. at 2415 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
105. Id. (quoting Dole v. Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct 929, 930 (1990)).
106. Id. at 2415 (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)).

107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 2418.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2415 (citing EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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election, they fall under the "elected to public office" exception of the
ADEA."'
B. The Equal Protection Claim...
The plaintiff judges also argued that the mandatory retirement provision
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution."' The judges claimed that Missouri had shown
no rational basis for two distinctions: first, between judges who have reached
age 70 and younger judges; and, second, between judges 70 and over and
other state employees of the same age who are not subject to mandatory retirement.1 6 Because age is not a suspect classification and there is no fundamental interest at stake, 17 "'courts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws."""'
The Court pointed out that the mandatory retirement provisions are found
in the Missouri Constitution, and are, therefore, given more weight than mere
"governmental action.""' 9 The Court used the standard of Vance v.
Bradley,"? which states that "we will not overturn such a [law] unless the
varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes
that we can only
1
conclude that the [people's] actions were irrational.""2
The state raised several rational bases for Missouri's mandatory
retirement provision.' Among the bases raised were (1) maintaining high

113. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2404; see Mo CONsT. Art. V., § 25(c)(1) (concerning
the procedures for the retention elections of Missouri state court judges).

114. Justice White and Justice Stevens joined the five member majority opinion
concerning the equal protection claim. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2408. Justice Blackmun
and Justice Marshall did not rule concerning the equal protection clause. Id. at 241419.
115. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ...deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST., amend.

XIV.
116. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406.
117. See supra note 66 and accompanying text,

118. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2406 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979)).
119. Id. at 2406 (The court stated that the Missouri Constitution "reflects both the
considered judgment of the state legislature that proposed it and that of the citizens of
Missouri who voted for it.").
120. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
121. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2406 (quoting Bradley, 440 U.S. at 97).
122. Id. at 2406-07. The state cites to O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo.

1978), which upheld a mandatory retirement statute that established age 70 as the
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competency in judicial posts, (2) elimination of a wasteful judge-by-judge
competency determination, (3) orderly attrition, and (4) ease and predictability
of administering pension plans." The Court held that each of these bases
was sufficient to rebut the judges' claim of no rational basis."'
The Court proceeded to point out the shortcomings of the alternatives
available to the state. Voluntary retirement was seen as an insufficient
mechanism.12s Likewise, impeachment was characterized as having "elaborate procedural machinery" that would not as effectively serve the goal of
retaining qualified judges.1 26 Also, the retention election process may not
adequately protect the judiciary because the general public is less likely to
follow the actions and opinions of state court judges. 127 Finally, Missouri
judges are less accountable to the people of Missouri, the Court thought,
because of the judges' lengthy terms.'2
The Court noted that "[t]he Missouri mandatory retirement provision...
is founded on a generalization." 29 The Court also pointed out that many
judges do not suffer any "significant deterioration in performance at age
'
The imperfections of a state's laws, however, do not violate the
70.t3O
Equal Protection Clause.' 32 Thus, Missouri's requirement did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
V. COMMENT
Justice White's concurrence is the best use of judicial restraint in
deciding the case. Although the result he reached mirrors the majority's
decision, his rationale as to the applicability of the Supremacy Clause and the
unnecessary establishment of new tests shows moderation while reaching the
same result. The majority's exposition of a new "plain meaning rule" standard

retirement age for state probate and magistrate judges. Numerous rational bases were
included in this decision. Id. at 766-67.
123. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2407 (quoting the O'Neil rational bases).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316).
132. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2408; ("The people of Missouri rationally could
conclude that the threat of deterioration at age 70 is sufficiently great, and the
alternatives for removal sufficiently inadequate, that they will require all judges to step
aside at age 70. This classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.").
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puts another technical burden on Congress to show that preemption was
intended. This standard appears especially unnecessary when the ADEA
purpose is broad and its exceptions limited and narrowly construed.
The decision also runs afoul of the intent of Congress as evidenced by
the legislative history. The broad scope of ADEA, when combined with the
instructions to construe its exceptions narrowly, contradicts the decision in this
case. Contrary to the majority's holding, the drafters of the ADEA did not
intend to include a laundry list of persons covered; rather, the intent seems to
have been to cover all persons, other than those specifically excluded. The
majority's interpretation of the ADEA's purpose not only limits its applicability, but also its usefulness. By ignoring the broad scope of the ADEA the
majority has unnecessarily added to the confusion that accompanies statutory
construction. Although the statutory construction arguments are tenable on
either side, the better argument is not found in the majority opinion.
The outcome of cases in this area ultimately should rest on the role of
the judiciary in American jurisprudence and on the role of state citizens in
determining the qualifications of their judiciary as the state uses the election
route.
Today, most persons have accepted the notion that judges are makers of
policy, rather than oracles of natural law. Thus, the citizenry has demanded
more control over the appointment or election of its judiciary. While some
states elect members to their highest courts, other states have, through their
citizens, chosen to limit the terms of the high court's members through
mandatory retirement provisions. It seems that the states that have chosen to
limit the judge's terms via the mandatory retirement route should be given the
same opportunity to shape their state judiciary.
Finally, the competency of older judges is an issue requiring sensitivity
and thoughtfulness. Although the normal aging process eventually reduces
everyone's capacity to perform certain tasks, the process is neither uniform
nor predictable. Thus, an arbitrary age limit, when applied to many
individuals, is often inequitable. Therefore, the citizens of states that have
chosen to use mandatory retirement provisions to regulate their judiciary may
have chosen an irrational means to reach their desired purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION

In deciding Gregory v. Ashcroft, the majority resolved a split in the
circuits that allowed some judges to retain their positions while other judges
were forced into retirement. Unfortunately, the majority failed to adequately
limit its holding and may have unnecessarily created a new battery of tests in
the application of federal law to the states.
PAUL SCOTw? PENTICUFF
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